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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
, RODNEY K. STARKS , 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 16609 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of 
' :·!ans laughter, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Mn. §76-5-205 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest 
F. Baldwin, Jr. , Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, RODNEY K. STARKS, was charged by Information 
with the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1953 as amended). On 
the 27th of June, 1979, the appellant was convicted of Manslaughter, 
a lesser included offense. On July 13, 1979, the appellant was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in the Utah 
1 
State Pris on. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and 
judgment rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third 
Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 29, 1978, police officers were 
' dispatched to the area of 250 West and 3300 South to investigate f 
a shooting. They foi.md Joseph Boykin lying in the middle of 
33rd South approximately 400 or more feet down the road from 
the parking lot adjacent to the Golden Fleece Bar. (T .12) 
An establishment known as the Touch of Class Massage Parlor 
was downstairs from the Golden Fleece Bar, and Kim's Massage 
Parlor was around the corner on 3rd West and 3200 South. (T.20) 
To develop the circumstances surrounding the shooting, 
the prosecution called Kaylene Griggs to the stand. She was 
an ex-girlfriend of the deceased, and a friend of the appellar.:' 
through her employment with him at Kim's Massage Parlor. (T.28 
On the evening of the shooting she had arranged to "perm" the 
appellant's hair after her shift as a dancer at the Golden Flee:: 
Bar. (T. 27) She testified that when appellant called her 
from downstairs to inform her he was ready to pick her up, 
she asked if he would come up and wait by the door because 
Joe Boykin had been bothering her in the bar. (T. 31) The 
appellant came upstairs, and when he and Kavlene proceeded o~ 
to the car, Joe followed. (T.34) Kaylene stated that, 
-2-
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despite her objections, Joe insisted that she talk with him. 
She said Joe also talked about running into a friend who wanted 
to borrow his gun, but he said he felt like he was going to 
need it. (T.53) Meanwhile, Peter Isaacson approached the 
three and attempted a friendly conversation, but left shortly 
thereafter when he saw that things were tense. (T.35) 
Joe was growing angry with Kaylene's refusal to go with him, 
and appellant was trying to calm him down. When Joe grabbed 
Kaylene's arm and pulled his fist back, appellant stepped in 
and put his arm up toward him. (T.35,36) Kaylene then stooped 
down to place her suitcase and drink inside the car, and several 
seconds later heard a noise like shots. (T.37) She said when 
she looked up she saw Joe running in front of the appellant. 
(T. 37) 
On cross-examination, counsel asked Kaylene if appellant 
had ever seen Joe violent, and she answered that he had. 
She testified that one evening at the Black Bull with appellant 
and Al Cortez present, Joe dragged her outside and beat her up. 
(T.43) Additionally, she had told the appellant about two 
experiences she had had with Joe. The first involved an alleged 
"ride" that Kaylene took with Joe which led to Joe's forcing sex 
on Kaylene at his house. (T.46) The second involved Joe's 
dragging Kaylene from a neighbor's house, and the observation 
by two men who gave chase that they thought Joe had a gun. (T.48) 
-3-
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Peter Isaacson was called by the State and testified 
to substantially the same facts as Kaylene. He said that when 
he walked over to say hello, Joe appeared to be angry with him. 
and acted as if he wanted to fight. (T.113) Peter walked 
away when the appellant advised him that it would be better if 
he just left, but later looked back to see Joe grabbing Kaylene': 
arm and appellant removing it. He said the appellant and Joe 
backed off, with Joe taking the offensive as if he wanted to 
fight. (T .117) A volley of shots rang out, and both ran, wit:, 
Joe in front and the appellant behind. (T.121) The testimony 
established that the gun used in the shooting belonged to a 
female employee of Al Cortez, the appellant's boss. Al had 
taken the gun from his employee for her protection, and then 
placed it under the seat of the car that he had loaned appellar.: 
on the night of the crime in question. (T.92) 
Dr. Serge Moore testified for the State in order to 
establish the nature of the wounds received by the victim and 
the cause of death. He said that there were four gunshot 
wounds, but that the one which caused Boykin' s death was the 
bullet which entered the left thigh, and coursed from left 
to right injuring the femoral artery. (T.83) Dr. Moore 
stated that the fatal shot and also the shot to the right wris: 
area could only have been inflicted if the victim was facing 
· h 1 "d (T.83) Moorealsc the assailant, or turned slig t y si eways. 
testified that such conclusion, along with the defendant's eta:· 
that the victim had his hand in his pocket, were consistent 
with the angles at which the two shots entered the body. (T.; 
-4-
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The appellant took the stand and first testified about 
his observations and knowledge of Joe's violent acts. He 
described the incident at the Black Bull, Joe's alleged rape of 
Kaylene, and Joe's threats to Kaylene's neighbors as he abducted 
her. (T.166, 174, 177) Additionally, the appellant stated that 
Al Cortez told him on one occasion of Joe's possession of a 
gun. (T.175) The appellant then related the sequence of events 
on the evening of the 29th in substantially the same fashion 
as the State's witnesses. He said that when he arrived to pick 
up Kaylene, he noticed Joe's car in the parking lot, and so 
armed himself and called her from downstairs. (T. 180) When 
Kaylene and the appellant walked out of the bar, Joe followed 
behind, and the appellant heard him say something about needing 
his gun. (T.183) The appellant stated that upon reaching the 
car, he ushered Kaylene into it as Joe was urging her to come 
with him and talk. (T.184) When appellant was halfway around 
the car, Joe had opened the door and was pulling Kaylene out. 
(T.185) Appellant returned and loosed Kaylene from Joe, all the 
while attempting to calm Joe down and denying that Kaylene was 
his girl. (T.86) When Peter came over, Joe made aggressive 
moves toward Peter, whereupon appellant advised Peter to leave. 
(T.190) Peter left, and as Kaylene attempted to get into the 
car again, Joe grabbed her arm and drew his fist back in a 
position to strike. (T.191) Appellant testified that he grabbed 
Kaylene's other arm, and when Joe stuck his hand in his pocket 
and told appellant not to go in his pocket, appellant panicked 
-5-
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and shot at the hand in fear that it held a gun. (T.193) 
He said at first the gun wouldn't shoot, but when he got it 
working he shot two to three times at Joe's hand as Joe was 
"jumping around". (T.194) During this time Joe was positioned 
kind of sideways with his right hand in his pocket. Joe starte' 
"pedaling backward" and when he reached the sidewalk, appellant 
chased him out of the parking lot, firing in his direction ri~ 
no realization that he had ever hit him. (T .197) Joe ran aero 
the street, stumbled on the sidewalk and fell, then got up, tor 
his shirt off and ran down the middle of the street toward the 
railroad tracks. (T.198) Shortly thereafter, the appellant 
went to Kim's Massage Parlor, threw the gun on the floor, and 
walked back outside where he was arrested. (T.200) 
ARGUMEUT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBt~ITTING SECTION 2 (a) 
OF INSTRUCTION NO. 22 TO THE JURY WHERE THE 
INSTRUCTION WAS UNWARRANTED BY THE FACTS OF THE 
CASE. 
Appellant argues that he shot the victim in self-defen' 
Such a defense was established not only by the state's witnessi 
but by the physical evidence. Both Kaylene Griggs and Peter 
Isaacson testified that Joe Boykin attempted to forcefully 
abduct Kaylene, and when the appellant tried to protect her, 
Boykin responded with aggressive, fighting actions. l"oreover. 
1 11 a s his alle; Joe's prior violent acts towards Kay ene, as we 
possession of a gun, were known by the appellant. The restL~· 
' · D Serge M.oore also supported appell 3~ of the State s witness r. 
-6-
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claim of self-defense. The fatal shot was fired while the 
victim was slightly turned and facing the appellant, and while 
he had his hand in his pocket. This was entirely consistent 
with the appellant's testimony that he shot at Boykin as he turned 
slightly and held his hand in his pocket. Appellant's right 
to defend himself must be judged when the fatal shot was fired, 
and the victim's actions at that point clearly indicated the 
possession of a gun. Appellant was justified in shooting for 
fear a concealed weapon in the victim's pocket might be used 
against him. 
The trial court submitted an instruction on self-defense 
to the jury, but included an instruction on "aggression" and 
"mutual combat" which appellant contends prejudiced him in 
his claim of self-defense. The court charged the jury that 
appellant was not justified in using force as allowed under 
subsection (1), Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402 (1953 as amended), 
if he was the aggressor or engaged in combat by agreement under 
subsection (2) (c). Those sections provide: 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using 
force against another when and to the extent that he 
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's 
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a person 
is justified in using force ~hich is.int7n~ed or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily inJury. 
only if he reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury . . 
to himself or a third person, or to prevent the co1llllU.ssion 
of a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under 
the circumstances specified in paragraph one of this 
section if he: 
-7-
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(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat 
by agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounte a~d :ffectively communicates to such other person r 
his ~ntent to do so and the other notwithstanding 
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawf 1 
force. u 
Appellant contends that the inclusion of subsection (2)(c) 
in the Instruction was error as it is inapplicable to the ~c~ 
of the instant case. 
It is axiomatic that the defendant is entitled to have 
the jury instructed on his theory of the case if there is any 
substantial evidence to .iustify giving such an instruction. 
See State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 738, at 743 (Utah 1%7). And 
as a general rule it is not erroneous for the court to instruct 
the jury by defining the crime in the language of the statute 
if the jury is not confused or misled thereby. See 53 Am. Jur, 
Trial §639, p. 494. But a charge should not be given unless 
the facts in the case justify it. Since a charge on mutual 
combat, or one on aggression and provoking the difficulty, is a 
limitation on the right of self-defense, such a charge is 
erroneous where it is not supported by the issues and evidence 
in the case. See 41 C.J.S. §378 Homicide, p. 171, and 41 C.JS 
§383 Homicide, p. 187. 
Thus, in Cullin v. State, 565 P. 2d 445 (Wyo. 1977), whi'.: 
an instruction limiting the claim of self-defense (if the jurf 
found that the defendant provoked the difficulty or was the 
aggressor) was approved, it was declared that it is the court's 
obligation initially to determine whether there is evidence 
before the jury from which it could infer that the defendant 
-8-
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the aggressor so as to be deprived of the right of self-defense. 
If not, the court emphasized, "[t]he instruction cannot be given 
as a matter of course in every case involving a claim of celf-
de fens e. " Id at 451. In Cull in the court was justified in 
instructing the jury as it did in light of the defendant's threats 
to kill, her overpowering jealousy, and her arming herself and 
searching out the victim. 
Other courts have recognized the same principle and 
add that if a statutory instruction does not fit a particular 
case, other supplementary instructions must be given to fairly 
state a def?ndant's position. See Bustamante v. People, 401 
P.2d 597 (Col. 1965). Thus, in Williams v. State, 513 P.2d 335 
(Okla. Cr. 1973), the defendant's conviction of murder with 
a firearm was reversed for the trial court's failure, inter 
alia, to define "aggressor" in connection with its instruction 
on self-defense. The court charged the jury that it could acquit 
the defendant unless he entered into the difficulty voluntarily 
or was the aggressor, yet failed to define what constitutes an 
"aggressor". The court concluded that this failure was fatal, 
noting that it could only cause confusion in the minds of the 
jurors; 
It is prejudicial to a defendan~ to give an instr:iction 
on the issue of self-defense which tends to describe 
him as an aggressor without further definition 
of aggression and the aggressive acts that would 
deprive him of self-defense. ld at 340. 
')imilarly, in Qassett v. State, 587 SW 2d 695 (Tex. 1979) the 
court reversed a murder conviction, holding that the evidence 
-9-
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... 
I 
introduced was sufficient to require additional instruction on 
the accused's right to carry arms to the scene of the difficul: 1 
While evidence supported the trial court's instruction that the 
defendant could not claim self-defense if the jury found that 
he provoked the difficulty, the court concluded that, under 
the facts, the supplemental instruction was necessary to 
ameliorate the limitation imposed on the defendant's claim of 
self-defense. 
Appellant contends that even the inclusion of a supple: 
instruction informing the jury of the nature and quality of an; I 
acts which would operate to limit his right of self-defense 
would not rectify the trial court's error. He claims he was 
not an "aggressor" as defined by the court in State v. Shoenfe' 
545 P. 2d 193 (Ut. 1976). In that case the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that the instructions given by the lower court were 
generally in accord with Utah's law, thereby sanctioning the 
definition of aggressor as given by the trial judge; 
An aggressor is one who willingly and knowingly 
initially provokes a combat or does acts of such 
a nature as would ordinarily lead to combat. 
A person can also be classified as an aggressor 
if he leaves the scene of a quarrel, arms 
himself and then returns to the scene and renews 
the quarrel. Id at 196. 
Generally, some of the acts that may ordinarily le~ 
to combat have been held to be abusive or insulting language, 
certain gestures, the making or causing of assault or atta~, 
commission of crime, trespass or resistance to trespass, 
criminal intercourse with the wife or daughter of another, '' 
-10-
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in some instances the carrying of arms. See 40 C.J.S. §119, 
Homicide, p. 992. Illustrative is the Utah case of State v. Turner, 
79 P.2d 46 (1938), wherein the court concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence to justify an instruction to the jury that 
they could find the defendant to be the aggressor. In that 
case an argument developed over the payment of a bill in a 
restaurant, and when a customer insulted the owner (the defendant), 
the defendant responded, "You goddamn crazy son-of-a-bitch, no 
man can come in my place of business and insult me like that." 
Id at 48. The defendant then exited to the kitchen, and returned 
first with a knife, and then with a gun. The court stated that 
the quarrel became menacing only when defendant uttered his 
threat and took up the knife, and found this evidence sufficient 
to justify a jury finding that the defendant was the aggressor. 
Similarly, in King v. State, 232 SE 2d 236 (Ga. 1977), 
the defendant urged that there was insufficient evidence to 
authorize a charge that a person is not justified in using force 
if he initially provokes the use of force against himself. 
There defendant's brother had argued with the deceased, and 
defendant, though not involved, followed deceased into his 
house. He was unwelcome, and when asked to leave, persisted 
in his entrance. Both deceased and his companion, a woman, 
shot at defendant, between his legs and behind him, whereupon 
he left. He returned the following day and shot and killed 
deceased. The court concluded that the instruction given was 
?~oper where the defendant armed himself with a shotgun with 
the purpose of shooting the deceased, went to the home of the 
-11-
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deceased with the gun visible, and threatened to shoot the 
deceased. 
By contrast, in the following cases the courts 
refused to limit the defendant's claim of self-defense by an 
instruction on aggression where the facts were not supportive 
of such a charge. In State v. Bristol, 84 P.2d 757 (Wyo. 1938) 
the defendant assisted in ejecting one Skogerson from a barroo: 
and later encountered him in a cafe. Testimony indicated tha: 
the defendant paused briefly at a booth occupied by Skogerson 
and others, and momentarily "glared" at one of the witnesses. 
An affray ensued, initiated by Skogerson' s hitting Bristol in 
the face, and culminating eve~tually in a shot which killed 
Skogerson. The trial court instructed the jury that one who '.s 
aggressor or provokes a difficulty cannot invoke the right of 
self-defense, to which defendant excepted. Despite the facts 
that the defendant armed himself, went where Skogerson was, ar.: 
"glared" at someone, the reviewing court disapproved the ins::·; 
The court observed that "trivial words or slight provocation,:. 
reasonably calculated and probably not designed to bring abou: 
immediate fatal encounter, have never been deemed sufficient:: 
deprive a defendant of his right of self-defense." Id at 766. 
Similarly, in the case of Peon le v. Townes, 218 NW 2C 
136 (Mich. 1974), the court found erroneous a self-defense 
instruction premised on the assumption that the jury could 
reasonably infer that the defendant was the aggressor 
Townes case, defendant entered a tire store belonging to c\.,e 
deceased, and loudly accused an employee of dating his wife 
-12-
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When the deceased intervened and asked defendant to leave his 
store, defendant refused. Deceased reappeared shortly 
thereafter with a pistol at his side and reordered the defendant 
to leave. Defendant backed out of the store, and from there the 
evidence was in conflict as to whether defendant re-entered the 
store and shot deceased, or whether deceased made a sudden 
movement which caused defendant to shoot in what he believed 
to be self-defense. In any event, the court concluded that the 
lower court was unjustified in charging the jury that the defendant 
could not claim self-defense if he was found to be an aggressor 
in the difficulty. The trial court erroneously assumed that 
if the defendant was at fault in provoking a disturbance in 
the tire store, he was then accountable as an aggressor for 
any response to his conduct. The evidence did not support the 
inference that defendant's actions were designed to provoke 
a difficulty with deceased so that defendant could harm him, 
nor was there any indication that deceased intervened with the 
intention of protecting his person. The only reasonable 
conclusion that could be drawn, the court observed, was that 
deceased sought to protect his property, and a threat to property 
is not a legally sufficient provocation to render the defendant 
an aggressor. The court concluded that the erroneous instruction 
was clearly prejudicial to the defendant where it could literally 
foreclose his claim of self-defense; 
-13-
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--
"[W]hern~ver a judge, by his charge, proposes 
to deprive a defendant of his right of 
s7lf-defense, he must be enabled to lay 
his hand on the facts which justify him in doing 
so; and, unless he can, he should abstain from 
giving a charge of this character, because, however 
groundless the charge may be, corning as it does 
fro~ the court! it is c~l~ulated to make the jury 
believe that, in the opinion of the judge, there 
was evid7nc7 tending to show that appellant brought 
on the difficulty for the purpose of slaying his 
adversary; and consequently such an instruction, not 
authorized by the testimony, is calculated to 
injure or impair the rights of the defendant." 
McCandless v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 58, 64-65, 
57 S.W. 672 (1900). 
Appellant contends further that the court's limitation 
on his claim of self-defense cannot stand on the theory of 
mutual combat in the abs~nce of facts to support such a charge. 
Generally, mutual combat requires a mutual intent to fight, 
which is manifested by acts and conduct of the persons 
involved, and circumstances surrounding the combat, including 
those leading up to the actual fight itself. See 40 C.J.S. 
§122 Homicide, p. 997. According to the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 738, at 742 (1947), "combat" is a f'.; 
duel, or struggle for supremacy between at least two persons. 
The court further states that "it [combat] savors of not only 
the intent to participate' but also the actual participation °:· 
both parties. It cannot be enlarged to include a one-sided 
attack on an innocent victim. The acts of one man can never 
constitute a "combat". Id. 
Thus, in the case of Tr-uj illo v. People, 3 72 P. Zd 86 
(Col. 1962), the court found that even where defendant and 
deceased went to the scene of the homicide to engage in a 
result ;ng in death were not inflicted b:
1 
fight, the injuries ~ 
-14- J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
L 
defendant during such combat. Although the altercation began 
as a mutual combat, it ended when defendant continued to kick 
the deceased after he was knocked to the ground. Since the 
kicks were the cause of death, an instruction on mutual 
combat was held to be unwarranted. Similarly, in Flowers v. State, 
247 S.E. 2d 217 (Ga. 1978), the appellant and victim had engaged 
in a game of "mercy" whereby each tried to out-grip the other's 
hand in a showdown of strength. The contest evolved into a 
fist fight, and culminated in a shotgun blast which killed the 
victim. The court found that there was no evidence showing an 
agreement between the men to fight with weapons. Concluding 
that the charge to the jury on mutual combat was reversible 
error the court observed; "[t]o charge on mutual combat, when 
there is no evidence to support it, effectively cancels the 
justification defense." Id at 218. 
There is no evidence in the instant case that the appellant 
voluntarily participated in a contest or mutual combat for 
purposes other than protection. There is no manifestation of 
agreement or intent to fight; to the contrary, there is every 
indication that appellant was attempting to avoid a confrontation 
with Joe. He called Kaylene from downstairs, said nothing to 
Joe as he ushered Kaylene out of the bar, and attempted for a 
substantial period of time to calm Joe down. Nor is there 
any evidence that the appellant was an aggressor in the incident. 
He did not willingly and knowingly provoke a combat, nor did 
-c engage in acts that would ordinarily lead to combat. 
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545 P.2d, at 196. No evidence appeared at trial that appell~: 
used abusive or insulting language, that he caused an 
assault, 
that he committed a crime, or that he threatened to kill Joe. 
Appellant was carrying a gun, but not for purposes of brandish::.: 1 
it in a threatening manner. He anned himself in anticipation 
of a possible attack, and his right to exercise self-defense 
was preserved where he did nothing else or nothing wrongful 
' to provoke or bring on a difficulty. See 40 C. J. S. §119 Homici·'.ei 
p. 992. The conclusion is clear that appellant was not the 
aggressor nor did he engage in combat by agreement. Subsection.I 
of Instruction No. 22 is simply not applicable to the facts of 
the ins cant case, and the trial court erred in submitting it tc 
the jury. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO 
THE JURY APPELLANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION (R.72) 
AS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW IN UTAH. 
To buttress his claim of self-defense, which was amply 
supported by testimony and physical evidence offered by the 
State, appellant testified regarding his knowledge of Boykin's 
propensity for violence. He described three instances he had 
either witnessed or learned about through Kaylene Griggs. 
Kaylene testified for the State and verified the appellant's 
· · d Appellant contends that since h'.; knowledge of these inci ents. 
knowledge of the victim's previous violent acts bears direct1:1 
on the reasonableness of his action in self-defense, he was 
entitled to an instruction to that effect. He properly exce~:' 
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to the trial court's failure to give his proposed Instruction 
No. (R.72) which reads; 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that all evidence known to 
RODNEY K. STARKS, on September 29 1978 
concerning the reputation and spe~ific acts of 
~iolence and aggressiveness of Joseph L. Boykin 
is relevant to your determination of Rodney 
K. Starks' state of mind and the reasonableness 
of his conduct at the time of this incident. 
On the basis of this evidence, considered in 
conjunction with the rest of the evidence in this 
case, if you find that there is a reasonable 
doubt that Rodney K. Starks committed the 
offense, then you must find Rodney K. Starks 
not guilty. 
As a general rule, the defendant, after laying a proper 
foundation by evidence tending to show that he committed a 
homicide in self-defense, may introduce evidence of the 
violent and turbulent character of the deceased. See 1 ALR 3d 571, 
§3. The reputation of the deceased as a dangerous and turbulent 
person is offered for the purpose of determining who was the 
aggressor, or for buttressing the reasonableness of the defendant's 
apprehension of imminent danger. See State v. Canedo, 563 P.2d 
315 (Ariz. App. 1977). Additionally, specific acts of violence 
toward third persons known or observed by the defendant prior 
to the homicide may be introduced to show that the decedent 
was of a violent and turbulent disposition. Id. Specific acts, 
unknown by the defendant and directed toward third persons, 
as would reflect upon the conduct or motive of the parties at 
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the time of the affray are admissable in order to show who 
was the aggressor. Id. And threats actually communicated to 
the defendant are admissable to show who was the aggressor anc 
to show reasonable apprehension on the part of the defendant. 
Id. See also 40 C.J.S. §272 Homicide, p. 1221, and 40 C.J.S. 
§275 Homicide, p. 1230. 
Thus, in People v. Flores, a conviction of second degre: 
murder was reversed where the trial court refused to admit 
testimony that the victim had previously assaulted the defendar.: 
brother-in-law with an iron reinforcing bar in the presence 
of the defendant. The court held that such testimony was 
admissable in support of the defendant's theory of self-defense 
on the issue of the defendant's state of mind at the time of tr.: 
stabbing. And in the Utah case of State v. Minnish, 560 P.2d 
340 (1977), while the court held that no error occurred in 
excluding evidence of the victim's propensity for violence anc 
aggressiveness, it nevertheless recognized the general rule the: 
evidence pertaining to the character of the victim can be 
admitted where the defendant shows he acted in self-defense. 
In the present case, the trial court properly determine: 
that evidence of the deceased's specific and violent acts 
toward third persons was admissable, and allowed both Kaylene 
and appellant to testify regarding snecifi_c incidents of Joe's 
violent acts against Kaylene. Kaylene also testified that 
she was frightened of Joe as a result of threats he had ~de 
to her and things he had done to her in the past. (T.50) on: 
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this evidence was admitted, the a~~ellant was entitled to an 
instruction on it to support his theory of self-defense. 
Courts have focussed on why such an instruction ~s 
necessary, particularly where evidence in a case is closely 
balanced. In People v. Bush, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1978), the 
court held that the trial court erred in refusing to give 
defendant's proffered instruction that one who has received 
threats against her person by another is justified in acting 
more quickly and taking harsher measures for her own protection 
than a person who has not received such threats. The court 
explained that while the instructions given by the trial court 
did not necessarily exclude the prior threats from the jury's 
consideration, nevertheless the instructional reference to "present" 
and "imminent" danger might divert the jury's attention from the 
previous threats. Hence, failure to instruct on prior threats 
required reversal in view of the closeness of the case and the 
conflicting nature of the evidence. 
Courts have not given a hypertechnical construction to 
the requirement that the trial court instruct as to the victim's 
propensity for violence and turbulence. But they have required 
that the substance of the requested instruction be contained 
in the instruction actually given. Thus, in Baldwin v. State, 
538 S W. 2d 615 (Tex. 1976) where the defendant seriously 
injured the victim by hitting him over the head with a pipe, 
che court held there was no error in the trial court's failure 
co give the defendant's specially requested charge on self-defense 
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based on threats of the victim to kill the defendant. Instead, 
the instruction which was actually given by the trial court, 
in substance charging that the jury could consider the 
.. 
words or conduct of the victim in determining whether the appelt' 
acted reasonably, was held to be sufficient. Similarly, in 
Rice v. State, 567 P.2d 525 (Okl. Cr. 1977), where defendant she: 
and killed her husband, the court rejected the defendant's 
contention that the trial court erred in refusing to give 
her proffered instructions that the jury could consider 
evidence of the victim's communicated threats and threats to kL 
as showing the reasonableness of the defendant's acts. The 
court was of the opinion that the instructions actually 
given by the trial court adequately covered the area of law; 
"If you believe from the evidence that the defendant 
had received information that the deceased had, 
prior to the difficulty in which he lost his life, 
made threats of a violent nature toward and about the 
defendant, then you mah take such fact into considerat:: 
. . . in determining w ether . . . the defendant 
believed her life was in danger." Id at 529-30 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
The court reached a similar conclusion in Ramsey v. ~ 
558 P.2d 1179 (Okl. Cr. 1977), finding that the defendant's 
proffered instruction which included a paragraph placing undue 
emphasis upon the propensity of the victim to be violent was 
unnecessary. The court observed, however, that the instructfo:. 
d I 
actually given allowed the jury to consider the acts of th0 
in determining the defendant's justification in shooting him. 
In the instant case, no instruction whatsoever allowed the 
acts O f the deceased in assessing tt' jury to consider violent 
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reasonableness of the defendant's behavior. The trial court 
narrowed the jury's focus and allowed them only to consider 
whether force Nas necessary to defend against the victim's 
imminent use of unlawful force. As given, the instructions 
unduly limited the viability of the claim of self-defense, and 
was therefore prejudicial to the ap~ellant. 
A case directly on point and supportive of appellant's 
position is State v. Hall, 228 S.E. 2d 637 (N.C. 1976). In 
that case the defendant and one Jamieson engaged in a fight 
early in the afternoon, and twenty or thirty minutes later, 
while Jamieson was standing on the side of a street talking 
with friends, the defendant allegedly drove up and shot him in 
the leg with a rifle. Defendant offered evidence tending to 
show that Jamieson often carried a pistol, had been arrested 
for possessing two pounds of marijuana and had accused 
defendant of telling the police, and had threatened to kill 
the defendant. On redirect examination defendant also testified 
that Jamieson told him that he shot at somebody with his pistol. 
Defendant assigned as error the trial court's failure to 
correlate the evidence indicating that Jamieson was a dangerous 
and violent man with defendant's plea of self-defense. The 
Court of Appeals agreed, relying on State v. Rwmnage, 185 S.E. 
2d 221 (N.C. 1971), that where there is plenary evidence that 
deceased was a dangerous and violent man, the trial judge should 
charge as to the bearing the deceased's reputation as a violent 
~an might have had on defendant's reasonable apprehension of death 
or great bodily harm at the time of the attack. Thus, it was 
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error for the trial court to refuse to correlate, in its 
instructions to the jury, the evidence indicating that Jamieson 
was a dangerous and violent man. 
In State v. Eddington, 386 P.2d 20 (Ariz. 1963), the co;· 
recognized the soundness of such a conclusion, but held that 
in the absence of any evidence indicating that defendant knew 
of the violent character of the victim at the time of the shooL 
the court did not err in refusing to give a charge that the ju' 
could consider the victim's dangerous and turbulent character. 
In the instant case, Rodney Starks was aware of the 
victim's propensity for violence. Both Kaylene and appellant 
testified to appellant's knowledge of three particular incidenc 
manifesting Joe's turbulent and violent character. The appella: 
was entitled to an instruction that the jury could consider 
these incidents as they bore on the reasonableness of his appre' 
of the victim at the time of the difficulty. Failure to so 
instruct was prejudicial error. 
PE}INT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION ON REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE 
HYPOTHESIS. 
Appellant also excepted to the Court's failure to give 
an instruction on what is commonly referred to as reasonable 
alternative hypothesis (R.52,53, Proposed Insruction No.-' 
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To war7ant you in convicting the defendant, 
the evidence must to your minds exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the 
guilt of the defendant. That is to say, if 
after an entire consideration and comparison 
of all the testimony in the case you can 
reasonably explain the facts given in evidence 
on any reasonable ground other than the guilt 
of the defendant, you should acquit him. 
Recent Utah cases have clarified the circumstances under 
which the defendant is entitled to instruction on reasonable 
alternative hypothesis. In State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019 
(1978), this court observed; 
It has long been the law in this jurisdiction 
that the giving of such an instruction 
(reasonable alternative hypothesis) is 
neither appropriate nor required unless the 
roof of a material issue is based solel 
upon circumstantia evi ence. citing 
State v. Fort, 572 P.Zd 1387 (Utah 1977), 
State v. Garcia, 335 P.2d 57 (Utah 1960)] 
The policy behind instructing the jury on reasonable alternative 
hypothesis lies in protecting the rights of the accused. It 
emphasizes to the jury that they must be convinced by the 
evidence presented that the defendant is guilty of the offense 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 
For a public offense to be conrrnitted in the State of 
Utah, there must be a joint union of act and intent. A necessary 
element of the criITle of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second 
Degree, is that the defendant intended to cause the death of 
another. In the instant case, that critical element of guilt 
is wholly circumstantial. The state presented no evidence 
which overtly reflected on appellant's intent. Thus, the 
"""idence is subject to alternative conclusions; one, that the 
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shooting was perpetrated by the appellant to defend himself, 
and two, that the appellant intended to cause the victim's 
death with no justification. 
In such a situation the proof of the element of intent 
can be confusing to the jury. While the State still has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
did not act in self-defense, the jury is likely to cast the 
burden on the one claiming the defense. Thus, if the defendant 
fails to prove that it was absolutely necessary for him to 
defend himself, the jury is likely to return a verdict of guilt:.· 
In effect, the defendant has been forced to assume the burden 
of proof. The alternative reasonable hypothesis instruction 
helps to alleviate this confusion by emphasizing to the jury 
that they must acquit the defendant if his conduct can be expla'.: 
on a ground other than guilt. It was therefore improper, 
under the facts of this case, for the trial court to deny the 
giving of such an instruction. 
POIN'f IV 
THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS 
DENIED BY THE CUMULATIVE ERROR COl'lMITTED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Each of the errors in the preceeding points constitutes 
prejudicial error that would require a reversal of the judgmen'. 
of the court below. But these errors must also be considered 
to have had a cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial. 
The giving of an improper instruction, combined with the 
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refusal of the trial court to submit appellant's proffered 
instructions, operated to prejudice the appellant in the 
presentation of his defense. Appellant's right to a fair and 
impartial trial was irreparably damaged, and for such error 
he is entitled to a new trial. S~ate v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 
230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the individual 
and cumulative errors stated herein require reversal of the 
jury verdict and the judgment entered thereon. The appellant 
asks this court to grant him a new trial in the Third Judicial 
District Court. 
DATED this __ day of June, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. JOHN HILL 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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